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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRYANT R. WILSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920536-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), and Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a), 
whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and conviction 
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Appendix 1: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court fail to strictly comply with the 
Rule 11 requirements for accepting a guilty plea? "Gibbons . . . 
held that Rule 11(5) 'squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule [11(5)] requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered.'" State v. Hoff, 814 
P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1312 (Utah 1987); State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 
1991) ("Since questions of constitutional rights are questions of 
law, we give no deference to the trial court's conclusion . . . " ) ; 
State v. Petersen, 810 P. 2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) ("trial courts do 
not have discretion to misapply the law"). 
2. Should the guilty plea be withdrawn because the former 
trial attorney was ineffective in his representation? To be 
ineffective, counsel's performance must be (a) adjudged "deficient" 
[falling below an objective standard of reasonableness]; and (b) such 
performance must prejudice the outcome of the proceeding. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, reh'q denied, 467 U.S. 
1267 (1984); State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for theft 
by deception, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-405. (R 104, 106, 328, 364). On May 13, 1993, this Court 
granted Bryant Wilson's "motion for certificate of probable cause."1 
1 In its Order granting Mr. Wilson's motion for 
certificate of probable cause, this Court noted, "[t]he State 
conceded in open court that the appeal raises a substantial question 
of law or fact, likely to result in reversal, an order for a new 
trial, or a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment in 
jail . . . " See Appendix 2. The issues presented in this appeal 
are identical to the issues presented in Mr. Wilson's previously 
filed motion. 
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See Appendix 2 (attached is a copy of this Court's Order, dated May 
13, 1993). Since the proceedings which occurred prior to that time 
play an integral role in this appeal,2 they will be discussed at 
length below. See infra Statement of the Facts; Point II. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 11, 1991, Mr. Bryant Wilson and Mr. Steven 
Todd "were charged with one count of Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
and multiple counts of Theft by Deception." See Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, dated March 5, 1993 (Factual Finding, pi) 
(p = paragraph) (attached as Appendix 3); (R 13-46). John Bucher, 
Grant Morrison, and Ray Stoddard initially represented Bryant and 
Steven, although the trial court found that "John Bucher was the 
controlling attorney on the case[.]" Factual Findings, pp2 & 3. 
Mr. Greg Skordas represented the State of Utah. Factual Finding, p4. 
As part of the plea bargaining process, "Mr. Skordas had 
prepared a statement wherein he agreed in behalf of the State to 
stipulate to a plea withdrawal if [Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd] were 
committed to prison." Factual Finding, p5. Mr. Skordas' 
representations included the following: 
2 Bryant Wilson's brief on appeal stems from two separate 
trial court orders. On May 26, 1992, the trial court denied 
Mr. Wilson's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. (R 129-30). 
Mr. Wilson then appealed another trial court order, dated March 5, 
1993, (R 325-29), which resulted from this Court's Order of remand. 
(R 299-300). At no time did the State file a notice of appeal. 
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John [Bucher], 
As further inducement to settle this case, the 
State will affirmatively recommend that the defendants 
be granted probation & that if they are committed, 
contrary to the State's recommendation, to prison, we 
will stipulate to a plea withdrawel [sic] on both 
defendants, on all counts. 
[/s/] Greg Skordas 12/30/91 
See (R 123, 304) (emphasis in original) (a copy of the letter is 
attached as Appendix 4). 
Pursuant to Mr. Skordas7 letter and in accordance with the 
representations by John Bucher, Bryant Wilson and Steven Todd both 
pleaded guilty to one count of "Pattern of unlawful activity" and 
one count of "Theft by deception." See (R 82-88; 175-92). 
"Mr. Skordas, Mr. Bucher or the defendants did not apprise the 
[trial court] of the agreement." Factual Findings, p6. 
After the trial court noted the thirty (30) day time period 
for withdrawing the guilty pleas, counsel for Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Todd waived the time limitations for the sentencing proceeding. 
(R 185, 192). Initially set for January 27, 1992,3 sentencing was 
subsequently continued until March 9, 1992. (R 192-93). Mr. John 
3 The referral forms for the sentencing proceedings were 
found in the court file. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd both indicated 
that they did not receive the referral form (either a copy of the 
form or the original), which, in turn, led to a request by John 
Bucher to continue the matter in order to allow for the preparation 
of a presentence investigation report. (R 195). The State disputes 
whether both men received the forms, although the fact remains that 
John Bucher never made a companion request to extend the thirty day 
time period for withdrawing the guilty plea. 
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Bucher did not at any time request the trial court to extend the 
thirty day time period for withdrawing the guilty pleas. 
On March 9, 1992, the trial court sentenced Mr. Wilson to 
an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison on count one (a second degree felony), and a zero-to-five 
year term on count two (a third degree felony). The terms ran 
concurrently, with commitment beginning "forthwith". (R 208). The 
court imposed the same sentence on Mr. Todd and ordered both men to 
pay restitution. The parties agreed that a restitution hearing 
would be needed to determine the exact amounts owed and the persons 
who were entitled to collect restitution. (R 195, 201, 208-09). 
The hearing, however, was never held. 
Not only did defense counsel fail to extend the thirty day 
time period for withdrawing the guilty pleas, counsel failed to seek 
withdrawal of the pleas until March 24, 1992, (R 109), almost three 
months after the pleas had been initially entered. Defense counsel 
failed to recognize that he should have used Mr. Skordas' letter and 
stipulation as a basis for withdrawing the pleas. (R 123). When 
John Bucher finally moved to withdraw the guilty pleas, Mr. Skordas, 
in contravention of his prior letter agreement that he would 
stipulate to such an action, opposed the withdrawal motion. 
(R 113-116). On May 26, 1992, the trial court denied the request to 
withdraw the guilty pleas. (R 130). 
In a letter dated June 19, 1992, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd 
petitioned the trial court to appoint new counsel to handle their 
appeal. (R 135). The letter alleged and the Utah State Bar 
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confirmed that John Bucher had been suspended from the practice of 
law. (R 135); Utah B.J., Vol. 5, No. 7, page 26 (August/September 
1992).4 The trial court granted the motion to appoint appellate 
counsel and on August 5, 1992, the court appointed the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Ass'n as counsel for this appeal. (R 146-51). 
On behalf of their respective clients, newly appointed 
counsel then petitioned this Court for a certificate of probable 
cause. On October 15, 1992, this Court temporarily remanded both 
cases "to the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of 
fact relevant to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel." (R 299). 
On remand, during the December 14, 1992, proceedings, 
4 The notice in the Utah Bar Journal reads, inter alia, 
"On May 19, 1992, the Supreme Court entered an Order suspending John 
R. Bucher from the practice of law for a minimum period of 6 months 
and 1 day pursuant to Rule XIX, SUSPENSION FOR DISABILITY, of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. This Order was 
entered pursuant to Discipline by Consent wherein Mr. Bucher 
stipulated to this action in settlement of the complaints, described 
hereinafter, which charged that he violated Rules 1.3, (Diligence), 
Rule 1.7, (Conflict of Interest), Rule 1.13(b) (Safekeeping of 
Property), Rule 1.14 (Declining or Terminat[ing] Representation), 
and Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct). The factual allegations for those 
cases are stated more fully in the Bar Journal [and are matters 
unrelated to the case at bar]. 
In the present case, Mr. Bucher was paid "$7200 worth of 
brand new furniture and about $4,000 cash" for "services" which 
amounted to little more than the entry of plea proceeding and the 
sentencing proceeding. (R 270). Mr. Bucher told Bryant Wilson and 
Steven Todd to waive the preliminary hearing because it was a waste 
of time. (R 270-71). Notwithstanding an initial $4,000 payment and 
claims that "this [amount] is all you need to pay me and I'll take 
this case to trial [,]•' (R 259), Bucher's requests for money did not 
cease. However, neither case ever went to trial and the money was 
not returned. 
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Bryant Wilson testified that John Bucher, the initial trial counsel, 
guaranteed him and Mr. Todd that they would not go to prison (or 
jail) because of the prosecuting attorney's letter and stipulation. 
(R 251). If, as Mr. Skordas represented, the State's recommendation 
of probation was not followed, both men could withdraw their guilty 
plea and proceed to trial. John Bucher also told Bryant and Steven 
that they should not disclose the existence of the letter to the 
court. In addition, Mr. Bucher told Bryant and Steven that during 
their colloquy with the court, they should not respond in a manner 
which could jeopardize the agreed upon arrangement. (R 253-54). 
Mindful of John Bucher's instructions and his assurances 
that they had the prosecutor's letter to fall back on, Bryant Wilson 
and Steven Todd entered their guilty pleas to the agreed upon 
offenses. Shortly thereafter, however, Bryant and Steven both told 
Mr. Bucher that they wanted to change their pleas. Mr. Bucher 
declined to comply with his client's requests. (R 257). 
The prosecuting attorney during the remanded proceedings, 
Mr. Greg Skordas, chose not to cross-examine Bryant Wilson. 
Mr. Skordas further stipulated that if Mr. Todd were asked the same 
series of questions as Mr. Wilson, their testimony would be 
substantially the same. (R 272). Mr. Skordas did not testify about 
his prior involvement in these proceedings, nor did he call any 
witnesses to rebut Mr. Wilson's uncontroverted statements. 
When Bryant stepped down from the witness stand, his 
current counsel (Ms. Karen Stam) informed the trial court that prior 
counsel (Mr. John Bucher) led Bryant to believe that when he entered 
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into the plea agreement, withdrawal was a "legitimate legal option" 
available to them should their expectations under the plea agreement 
not materialize. The court did not dispute that Mr. Bucher's 
statements corroborated those of Mr. Wilson; the court only 
expressed concern that it was not apprised of the arrangements 
agreed upon by defense counsel and the prosecutor, Mr. Skordas. 
(R 274).5 But see Factual Finding, p22 ("Defendant Wilson testified 
5 The pertinent discussion follows: 
Ms. Stam: . . . Other than what has been testified to here 
today, I do believe there's a number of corroborating 
factors in the transcript and I call the court's attention 
particularly to pages 38 and 39 in the [May 18, 1992] 
transcript in which Mr. Bucher says that [Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Todd] were under the supposition when they entered into 
that plea that they believed that was a legitimate legal 
option for them to do. 
And I think that corroborates what you heard today both 
from Mr. Wilson— 
The court: The only thing is that no one told the court. 
Ms. Stam: Well, your honor, that's true and we certainly 
we don't hold it against the court. 
In terms of your prior rulings, . . . I don't think they 
[Mr. Bucher and Mr. Stoddard] felt it was in their interest 
to bring this up, but basically, I feel when the court 
looks at this in combination with the record, you'll see 
that [Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd] were in fact misled by the 
ineffective assistance of their counsel, . . . 
(R 273-74) (emphasis added). Page 38 of the referred to transcript 
reads: 
Mr. Bucher: There's the State's agreement to allow me to 
withdraw the guilty plea in case there is a prison 
sentence. That's what the agreement says, your honor. 
The court: Well, I'm not bound by that. 
Mr. Bucher: But I am—the only way I can make an argument 
you're bound is that [Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd] were under 
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at the hearing and his testimony was contradictory to his statements 
made at the time his plea was taken") . 
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court 
"concluded that the Defendants were not credible witnesses." 
(R 328); see generally Appendix 3 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, dated Friday, March 5, 1993). "It 'belies credibility' to 
think that Defendants would not say anything to either the Court or 
their counsel when the Court sentenced them to prison." Legal 
Conclusion, p2. "The [trial] [c]ourt cannot make a finding of 
ineffective counsel because there was no credible evidence presented 
that Mr. Bucher was ineffective." Legal Conclusion, p3. "The 
[trial] [c]ourt will allow Defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas 
to Count I because of the omission in the Information, but not 
because the guilty pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily." 
Legal Conclusion, p4. "The [trial] [c]ourt denies defendants' 
Motion to Withdraw their guilty pleas to Count II." Legal 
Conclusion, p5. 
As she had done the previous week, Ms. Stam, on Monday, 
March 8, 1993, again requested the trial court to consider the 
5 -[footnote cont'd]-
that supposition when they entered into that plea that they 
believed that this was a legitimate legal option for them 
to do. And if you have a plan under that illusion, dis-
illusion, or improper representation of reality, whatever 
you call it, if that's what he thinks, the plea is no good 
and he should be allowed to withdraw it, in all fairness. 
(R 214) (emphasis added). 
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affidavit of Mr. John Bucher, a certified document which essentially 
eviscerated the trial court's legal conclusions. (R 320-23). Even 
though Mr. Bucher's own interest would have been best served by 
covering up or disavowing the allegations made at the ineffective 
proceeding, John conceded that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd had 
immediately asked him to withdraw the pleas. Bucher first 
acknowledged that the guilty pleas were entered on December 30, 
1991. He then attested that, "Within two days of the entry of the 
defendants7 guilty pleas, both defendant's came to my office and 
Todd ask[ed] me to withdraw his guilty plea." (R 323); Appendix 5 
(Affidavit of John R. Bucher). John "advised the defendants that 
the motion was premature and that the motion should not be filed 
until the trial court sentenced them." (R 323). As stated 
previously, sentencing was on March 9, 1992, and Bucher did not move 
to withdraw the guilty pleas until March 24, 1992. (R 109, 117). 
The trial court refused to amend its order in accordance 
with Mr. Bucher's concessions. Mr. Wilson appealed this ruling by 
the trial court, (R 387); the State did not appeal. The remanded 
matter then was returned to this Court to address the merits of his 
petition for a certificate of probable cause. 
On May 13, 1993, "[t]he State conceded in open court that 
the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact, likely to 
result in reversal, an order for a new trial, or a sentence that 
does not include a term of imprisonment in jail, . . . " This Court 
then granted Mr. Wilson's motion for a certificate of probable 
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cause. The appeal now before this Court reiterates the issue(s) 
previously conceded by the State.6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court failed to strictly comply with the Rule 11 
requirements for accepting a guilty plea. It did not determine "if 
the tendered plea [was] a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement [had] been reached[.]" Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(5)(f). The "on the record" colloquy and the plea 
agreement both failed to disclose the pivotal role of the "behind-
the-scenes" plea agreement. 
The trial court additionally erred in not allowing 
Mr. Wilson to withdraw his plea in light of prior trial counsel's 
ineffective representation. The actions and inactions of prior 
counsel at times prior to and after the "entry of plea" proceedings 
were deficient and prejudical to the outcome. A new trial is 
required. 
6 Mr. Steven Todd, a codefendant in this matter, was also 
granted a certificate of probable cause for reasons identical to 
those conceded by the State in Mr. Wilson's case. See Mr. Steven 
Todd's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Petition for 
Certificate of Probable Cause, dated May 6, 1993 (because the 
circumstances relating to Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd have been treated 
as one and the same, where applicable Mr. Wilson incorporates by 
reference the arguments stated in Mr. Todd's Memorandum) (attached 
as Appendix 6); see also State v. Todd, Case No. 920536-CA (Utah 
App. brief filed July 1, 1993). 
- 11 -
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RULE 11 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court declared: "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts 
the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) 
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered," 740 
P.2d at 1312; see also State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1992) (noting that former Rule 11(e) has been replaced in part 
by Rule 11(5)). In State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992) (per 
curiam) (on petition for rehearing), the Court restated its "holding 
that (1) strict compliance with the elements of rule 11 is required 
in the taking of guilty pleas and (2) said compliance may be 
demonstrated on appeal by reference to the record of the plea 
proceedings. When plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the 
record (as when the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that 
the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the 
information contained therein), they may properly form a part of the 
basis for finding rule 11 compliance." 830 P.2d at 217 (emphasis 
added). 
Much emphasis has been placed on the plea agreement and the 
prosecutor's letter that he would stipulate to a withdrawal in the 
event the trial court imposed a term of imprisonment. (R 123). The 
court took issue with the fact that the letter which induced the 
plea was never brought to its attention. See Factual Finding, p6 
- 12 -
("Mr. Skordas, Mr. Bucher or the defendants did not apprise the 
[trial] [c]ourt of the agreement"). 
Aside from the problems accompanying the nondisclosure of 
the plea agreement, see Appendix 6, the trial court had the burden 
of "ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11[5] requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered." Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
at 1312. The court here failed to comply with paragraph (f) of 
Rule 11(5). The court was required to determine "if the tendered 
plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and 
if so, what agreement has been reached[.]" Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11(5)(f). 
During the December 30, 1991, entry of plea proceedings, 
the trial court initially explained that "even though there may be a 
recommendation made here by the State and Counsel, I don't have to 
follow them. And after receiving the presentence report you 
[Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd] just may leave right from here and go 
right out to the prison." (R 178). When the court conducted the 
plea colloquy with Mr. Todd, it addressed "promises" only in regards 
to the possible sentence which could be imposed: "Now, as I [the 
court] have explained to you [Mr. Todd], I have not made any 
promises as to the sentence that will be imposed upon you." 
(R 181). The court, though, said nothing about promises or 
inducements in regards to the plea agreement and whether "the 
tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached[.]" Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(5)(f). 
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The trial court's colloquy with Mr. Wilson was no better: 
"Now, as I [the court] explained to you [Mr. Wilson] before, and you 
heard it explained to Mr. Todd here, that there have been no 
promises made by this court as to the sentence that will be imposed 
upon you. On the date of sentencing after I get the presentence 
report, you could leave forthwith from here and go right to the 
prison." (R 188). Again, the court's references to "promises" were 
made only in relation to the sentence which could be imposed. 
Nothing was explored in regards to whether "the tendered plea is a 
result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, 
what agreement has been reached[.]" Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(f). The 
trial court colloquy failed to comply with the requirements of 
Rule 11. 
In addition, the standard preprinted clauses in the plea 
affidavits were not properly incorporated into the "on the record" 
plea colloquy. While affidavits may be "used to aid Rule 11 
compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing. The trial 
court must conduct an inquiry to establish that the defendant 
understands the affidavit and voluntarily signed it. . . . Any 
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during 
the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of 
the plea colloquy. Then the affidavit itself, signed by the 
required parties, can be incorporated into the record." Maguire, 
830 P.2d at 217-18 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citations omitted)). 
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Not only did the trial court here fail to address 
paragraph (f) of Rule 11 during the on the record colloquy, the 
court,s brief reference to the affidavit also was of no aid in 
meeting the paragraph (f) requirement. See Maquire, 830 P.2d at 217 
(emphasis added) ("plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the 
record fas when the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that 
the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the 
information contained therein]"). The court only made broad, 
conclusory statements and its reference to Mr. Wilson's affidavit 
did not mention the plea agreement or the paragraph (f) requirement: 
The court: What is your plea then to counts—first of 
all, do you have any questions about the procedures 
here today, about the elements or any part of the 
proceedings? 
[Bryant] Wilson: No, sir. 
The court: Are you willing to sign this statement in 
open court, then? 
[Bryant] Wilson: Yes. 
Mr. Morrison: We got it here, your honor. 
The court: Oh, this is Mr. Todd's. I was reading 
from Mr. Todd's on the facts. 
Are you willing to sign the statement in open 
court? 
[Bryant] Wilson: Yes. 
The court: Okay. Sign the statement in open court. 
The record may indicate the defendant [Bryant 
Wilson] has signed the statement in open court, and 
the court further finds that the defendant knowingly 
and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty fully 
understanding the elements of the crime. 
- 15 -
(R 190-91).7 
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever held 
that such a general reference to an affidavit satifies the 
requirements of Rule 11. See e.g., State v. Hoff# 814 P.2d 1119, 
1123 (Utah 1991) ("The practice of simply relying on defense 
attorneys and plea affidavits to explain the waiver of 
constitutional rights and to determine that a guilty plea was 
knowing and voluntary in every significant respect was deemed 
insufficient, and the burden was placed on the judge"); State v. 
7 The trial court7s colloquy and reference to Mr. Todd's 
affidavit was similarly deficient: 
The court: Would you [Mr. Todd] sign that statement 
now in open court. Now do you have any questions, 
whatsoever, before you sign the statement? 
[Steven] Todd: No sir, I don't. 
The court: Do you understand what you're doing? 
[Steven] Todd: Um-hum. Yes, sir. 
The court: Your answer is yes? 
[Steven] Todd: Yes, sir. 
The court: Go ahead and sign the statement, then. 
Mr. Bucher. The record should reflect the defendant 
has signed the statement and I'm presenting it back to 
the court. 
The court: Okay. May the record indicate the 
defendant has executed the statement in open court. 
The court finds that the defendant, fully 
understanding the elements of the crime, knowingly and 
voluntarily entered his plea of guilty. 
(T 184-85). 
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Valencia, 776 P. 2d 1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989) (per curiam) (if "an 
affidavit or form is signed by the accused and used as part of the 
guilty plea to evidence his or her understanding of the charged 
offense and the waiver of certain rights, that statement cannot 
serve as a mere substitute for the full and complete examination on 
the record by the trial court that is required by [Rule 11]"). 
Indeed, if the blanket incorporation of affidavits were allowed, the 
entry of plea proceedings would be no more than a one or two minute 
oral colloquy, assuming the written clauses in the affidavit 
complied with the Rule 11 requirements (e.g. the court: do you 
understand the contents of the affidavit? the defendant: yes; the 
court: do you have any questions? the defendant: no). Cf. State v. 
Dastrup, 818 P.2d 594, 595 n.2 (Utah App. 1991) ("The failure to 
conduct an adequate colloquy is correctly characterized as a 
violation of the common law rule established in Gibbons"), disavowed 
on other grounds, State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 n.2 (Utah 
1992) 
Although the affidavits for Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd both 
contained the preprinted clause regarding plea bargains, (R 74-75, 
pl3; 85-86, pl3), that clause and the affidavits as a whole were not 
properly incorporated for purposes of complying with Rule 11. 
Having failed to comply with Rule 11(f) either through the "on the 
record" plea colloquy or by proper incorporation of the affidavits, 
the trial court improperly accepted the involved guilty pleas. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING JOHN BUCHER 
INEFFECTIVE IN HIS REPRESENTATIONS OF MR. BRYANT WILSON 
At the outset, Mr. Wilson notes that the issue here is not 
whether the trial court's sentence improperly ignored the State's 
recommendation of probation. Rather, the primary concern is whether 
John Bucher's performance was (1) "deficient" (whether it fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness); and (2) whether the 
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 
1267 (1984); State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). In 
short, even if the trial court's order of imprisonment was 
appropriate, were the actions or inactions of Mr. Bucher deficient 
at any time prior to or after the entry of the guilty pleas? 
A. JOHN BUCHER PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY WHEN HE ADVISED 
MR. WILSON THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE COURT DID 
AT SENTENCING, THE PROSECUTOR'S LETTER ALLOWED 
HIM TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 
As part of the plea negotiation process, John Bucher 
obtained a letter from the prosecutor, Greg Skordas, wherein 
Mr. Skordas stipulated to the withdrawal of Mr. Wilson's and 
Mr. Todd's pleas in the event the trial court did not grant them 
probation. (R 123). While the prosecuting attorney's letter may 
have led Bryant and Steven to reasonably believe that it allowed 
them to avoid imprisonment, Mr. Bucher acted deficiently when he 
told his clients that the letter had more value than the trial court 
may have chosen to give it. (R 260) ("He [John Bucher] kept 
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stressing how powerful that letter was and he guaranteed we [Bryant 
and Steven] couldn't go to jail or prison at that time because of 
the [prosecutor's] letter"); (R 255) (Bucher told Bryant and Steven: 
"You guys do not realize the power of this letter . . . Regardless 
of what . . . Judge Rokich does at sentencing, we can approach him 
with that letter and we can change the plea regardless and you won't 
go to jail or prison at that time"). 
By statute, a plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon 
good cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6(2)(a). In short, Mr. Bucher unreasonably represented that 
the prosecutor's letter constituted "good cause." Cf. State v. 
Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991) ("The determination of 
whether good cause exists to withdraw a criminal plea traditionally 
rests within the discretion of the trial court. However, a trial 
court errs when it refuses to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
. . . that was not entered in strict compliance with [Utah R. Crim 
P.]ll(5) and (7)"); State v. Ross, 804 P.2d 112, 117 (Ariz. App. 
1990) ("To falsely inform a defendant of the consequences of his 
plea agreement, or to fail to honor the terms of the plea agreement, 
violates constitutional due process"). Since the "good cause" 
determination is left to the trial court, Bucher misrepresented the 
strength of the letter and improperly used it to induce the guilty 
pleas. 
The prejudice is obvious. "But for" Mr. Bucher's deficient 
performance, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, Bryant 
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Wilson would not have agreed to the plea bargain agreement. 
(R 255). Bryant would have proceeded to trial. 
B. JOHN BUCHER PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY WHEN HE FAILED 
TO EXTEND THE TIME PERIOD FOR WITHDRAWING THE 
PLEA OR FOR NOT COMPLETING THE SENTENCING 
PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE STATED TIME PERIOD 
Withdrawing a guilty plea not only requires "good cause," 
it also must be withdrawn "within 30 days after the entry of the 
plea." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b); see State v. Price, 837 P.2d 
578 (Utah App. 1992). John Bucher performed deficiently when he 
failed to either extend the time period for withdrawing the plea or 
for not completing the sentencing proceedings within the thirty day 
time period. The record does not reflect Bucher making any 
appropriate motions; in fact, Bucher7s own statements show that he 
"waive[d] the minimum and maximum time for sentencingf.]" (R 185) 
(waiver for Mr. Todd); accord (R 192) (Mr. Wilson's time for 
sentencing also was waived); cf. Factual Finding, p3 (John Bucher 
was the controlling attorney). 
Bucher additionally admitted that even though both Bryant 
Wilson and Steven Todd immediately asked him to withdraw their 
pleas, Bucher "advised [them] that the motion was premature and that 
the motion should not be filed until the trial court sentenced 
them." (R 323). Absent a finding of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Bucher7s inactions in light of the time constraints 
effectively foreclosed the opportunity to withdraw the guilty 
pleas. See Price, 837 P.2d at 582. 
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C. JOHN BUCHER'S REPRESENTATION, WHEN VIEWED IN PART 
OR AS A WHOLE, WAS DEFICIENT 
The above discussion and the attached arguments from 
Mr, Steven's Todd's "Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petition 
for Certificate of Probable Cause", filed May 6, 1993, see 
Appendix 6, provided the basis for the State's concession "in open 
court that [their] appeal raises a substantial question of law or 
fact, likely to result in reversal, an order for a new trial, or a 
sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment in 
jail, . . . " Due to the State's concession and in an attempt to 
avoid unnecessary repetition, Mr. Wilson attaches and incorporates 
the arguments set forth in Mr. Todd's supplemental memorandum. See 
Appendix 6. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Bryant Wilson respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's order denying his motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea and to remand the case for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fi day of July, 1993. 
RONALD S>FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
KAREN J. STAM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 0 day of July, 1993. 
S ^^T" 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of July, 1993 
- 22 -
APPENDIX 1 
76-6-405* Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over proper ty of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary tignifiramne, or puffing by statements 
imiikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means 
an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications ad-
dressed to the public or to a class or group. 
T7-13-3. Withdrawal of plea. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon rood 
cause shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is ™»H» by 
eJ^S^9 a n d a h a U ** m a d e w i t f a i a 3 0 **** a f t e r t h e mtrT °f the plea, (3) This section does not restrict the rights cf an imprisoned oerson undar Bule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: ™P™onea person under 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre* 
seated by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reason* 
able time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defen-
dant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insan-
ity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, 
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for triaL A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
an early triaL In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
dant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
triaL 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten-
dance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
(0 Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be che ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court, 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agree-
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. 
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(0 With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen-
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defen-
dant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(Amended effective May I, 1993.) 
APPENDIX 2 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAY 1 3 1993 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS . / 
OOOOO ^^^A^m^oonan 
Y cierK of the Court 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Bryant R. Wilson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 920535-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon (Law and Motion). 
This matter is before the court on a motion for certificate 
of probable cause. The State conceded in open court that the 
appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact, likely to 
result in reversal, an order for a new trial, or a sentence that 
does not include a term of imprisonment in jail, if appellant is 
successful on appeal. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, based upon the State's 
concession, and our further determination that the appeal is not 
taken for the purpose of delay, the motion for certificate of 
probable cause is granted, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is temporarily remanded 
to the trial court with directions to make the determination 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10(1)(c) (1990), and for 
imposition of appropriate conditions of release under section 77-
20-10(2). 
. i # -
Dated thxs Q day of May, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
'st*~S 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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XS THZ DISTRICT COURT 07 THZ THIRD 
lM*ifGiMK 
XN AND 7CR SALT TJlgg COUHTY, STATS 07 UTAH 
STATS 07 UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN RICHARD TODD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATS 07 UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRZANT R. WILSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
FXHDINGS 07 TACT ABB 
CONCLUSIONS 07 LAW 
CASE NO. 911901397 
Appeal No. 920535 CA 
CASH NO. 91190139t£ 
Appeal No. 920536 CA 
This Court hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Lav. 
1. Defendants were charged with one count of Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity and multiple counts of Theft by Deception. 
2. They were represented by John Bucher, Grant Morrison, and 
Ray Stoddard. 
3. John Bucher was the controlling attorney on the case; the 
other lawyers were acting at his direction. 
4. Mr. Skordas of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
represented the State of Utah. 
00325 
STAT2 V, TODD AND WILSON PAGE TWO FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
5. Mr. Skordas had prepared a statement wherein be agreed in 
behalf of the State to stipulate to a plea withdrawal if defendants 
were committed to prison. 
6. Mr. Skordas, Mr. Bucher or the defendants did not apprise 
the Court of the agreement. 
7. Defendants are knowledgeable, appeared to be intelligent 
and to have sufficient business acumen to operate a car brokerage 
firm. 
3. While awaiting sentencing, defendants opened a modeling 
agency business which is indicative of their business ability. 
9. The Court read the elements of Count I to the defendants 
from the Information, citing Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(1), 
Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, but in the preparation of the 
Information by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office an element 
was omitted. 
10. Mr. Skordas and Mr. Bucher concurred that Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1603(1), tJtah Code Ann., 1953' as amended 
constituted the elements of pattern of unlawful activity. 
11. The Court read to the defendants the elements of Count 
II, Theft by Deception, from Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 405, Utah 
Code Ann., 1953 as amended. 
nn^ofi 
STATE V. TODD AND WILSON PAGZ THREE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
Mr Skordas and Ht Bucher concurred that Title
 r 
Chapter 6, Section 405, se ft forth the elements of Theft by 
Defendants were asked if they had any question about the 
elements of crime or1 a ixy par t of tiie proceedings , and their 
Court explained to the defendants that there have 
been no promises made by the Court as to t h e sentence that woul 
x m p a s e a U p a n tihPTiu 
IS. The advised defendants that on the day of 
sentencing they could UH ...FIII" >I iireet 1
 f« hi *-ison. 
" * (Defendants nor counsel for the defendants or for the 
State of Utah uttered an objection to the Court's reference to 
imprisonment. 
17. The Court found that the defendants had knowingly and 
voluntarily entered their pleas of guilty :ounts I and II. 
13. ' 
pleas. 
IS. Defendants failed to withdraw their guilty please within 
111 iays. 
20. An evidentiary hearing was held on defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw their gui.l*— pleas because ineffective counsel. 
21. Mr. Bucher - ^^ appear witness. 
STATS V. TODD AND WILSON PAGE FOUR FINDINGS 5 CONCLUSIONS 
22. Defendant Wilson testified at the hearing and M ^ 
testimony was contradictory to his statements made at the time >>j? 
plea was taken* 
23. Defendant Todd did not testify. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concluded that the Defendants were not credible 
witnesses. 
2. It "belies credibility11 to think that Defendants would 
not say anything to either the Court or their counsel when the 
Court SBnUencexi them to prison. 
3. The Court cannot make a finding of ineffective counsel 
because there was no credible evidence presented that Mr. Bucher 
was ineffective. 
4. The Court will allow Defendants to withdraw their guilty 
pleas to Count I because of the omission in the Information, but 
not because the guilty pleas were not made knowingly and 
voluntarily. 
5. The Court denies defendants/ Motion to Withdraw their 
guilty pleas to Count II. 
Dated this £ dav of March, 1993. 
..-iy_- *<£UJL 
JOHN A- ROKXCH 
DISTRICT COURT JDDGZ 
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ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
Attorneys for Mr. Todd 
KAREN J. STAM 
RONALD S. FUJTNO 
Attorneys for Mr. Wilson 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt LaJce City, Utah 34111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
ay. 
KLfilfij|5T3fCT?r2!!T 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 2 2 1953 
SALTUKECOUNTY 
• i©liMi..^l 
FEB23B93 
U UL 
CQTTRT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I !./ / > 
STATE OF OTA , 
P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l e e , 
v . 
STTVLIJ' LliCIiZlRIJ 1 JVt\ _ • 
Defendant/Appellant* 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee , 
v. 
BRYANT R, WILSON, 
De fendant/ Appellant-
Stipulation 
To Enter Affidavit 
Into the Record 
Appeal Case Mo- 920535-CA 
District court No. 911901397 
Appeal Case No. 920536-CA 
District Court No. 911901397 
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, 
THIRD DISTRICT COORT JUDGE 
Come now counsel for luit? defendants nnl >. i niiiai'-il i1 i I 'I'm 
State, and hereby stipulate that the attached Affidavit of John R. 
Bm record and cons idered by t h i s Court 
in ruling on defendants/ motions to vacate tiieir convictions. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
L bi 
SKORDAS 
" COUNTY ATTORNEY 
^L 
KAREN J. STAM 
Counsellor Z&x. Wilson 
'•:{/4\J\\ }J-> A£ iL 
ELIZABETH!HOL3RQOK 
Counsel forCMr. Todd 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, r\CU. ^ y X . , hereby certify that I 
delivered or mailed a copy of the foregoing to Greg Skordas of the 
County Attorney's Office. 
/^q.sM~_ 
DELIVERED B> 
FEB Z 2 TO 
OATAnAMSHN 
2 -
E1IZA2ZTH A. 30WM?.:; 
Z1IZA3ZTH H0L3HC0F. 
Attorneys for Mr. Tcdd 
KAHiT J. STAM 
?.0~A1D 5. FUJINC 
Actorn*ys for !ir. Wilson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKZ LZGA1 DZFZNDZ?. ASSOCIATICi:' 
424 Zast 5GC South, Suite 3CC 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-3444 
IN THZ THIHD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAXZ COUN* 
STATZ 0? UTAJ-. 
STATZ OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
Affidavit of 
John ?.. 3ucher 
STEVEN RICHARD TODD. 
Defeniant/Apoelian: 
* Appeal Case No. 920535-CA 
District Court No. 91190139". 
STATZ OF "TT,\H 
Plamtif f/Appellee 
v. 
3RYANT R. WILSON. 
Defendant/Appei i ar 
* 
* Appeal Case No. 920535-CA 
District Court No. 9119C1397 
i HO::C?.A3LZ JOHN A. P.OXICH. 
:?.2 DISTRICT COURT JUDCZ 
I, JOHS ?.. 3UCH2?.. do hereby attest as follows: 
1. I was retained to represent Steven Todd in case number 
912901397. involving one count of Pattern of Unlawful Activity and 
multiple counts of theft by deception. 
2. The defendants entered cuilty pleas to one count of 
Pattern of unlawful activity and one count of theft by deception 
on December 30. 1991. 
3-. Within two days of the entry of the defendants* cuilty 
pleas, both defendant's came to my office and Todd ask me to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
4. I advised the defendants that the motion was premature and 
that the motion should net be filed until the trial court sentenced 
them. 
5. The trial court sentenced the defendants on 2!arch 9.. 1992. 
6. I moved to withdraw the cuilty pleas on March 30, 1992. 
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FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481) 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN (4276) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorneys for Mr. Todd 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN R. TODD, : SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
Petitioner/Appellant, : CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
v. : 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : Case No. 920536-CA 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
Petitioner Steven R. Todd respectfully submits this 
supplemental memorandum in support of his petition for certificate 
of probable cause. This matter, as well as codefendant Bryant R. 
Wilson's petition, is set for hearing on Wednesday, May 12, 1993, 
at 9:00 A.M. Mr. Wilson, by counsel, is filing a separate 
supplemental memorandum. Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson are referred to 
here collectively as "petitioners." 
APPELLATE PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A notice of appeal for both petitioners was filed June 3, 
1992. R. 132-3. A separate pro se notice of appeal was filed June 
22, 1992 by Mr. Todd and codefendant Bryant Wilson. R. 136. LDA 
was appointed June 23, 1992. A motion for certificate of probable 
cause was filed in the trial court on June 29, 1992 on petitioners' 
behalf. R. 140. This matter was heard by the trial court on 
MAV 6 1993 
* » * » 
August 8, 1992, and Judge Rokich denied the motion. See 
transcript, R. 242-61 (copy attached as Exhibit A) . LDA was 
appointed on August 3, 1992 as appellate counsel. R. 151 (Todd), 
R. 150 (Wilson) . LDA filed a notice of appeal in the district 
court on August 13, 1992. R. 152-3 (Todd), R. 154-5 (Wilson). 
Case No. 920412-CA, a duplicate appeal involving both petitioners, 
was properly dismissed for failure to file a docketing statement. 
R. 301. 
Petitions for Certificates of Probable Cause in the Court 
of Appeals were filed August 20 (Todd) and 28 (Wilson), 1992, 
together with the affidavit of Elizabeth Holbrook2 (Todd) and 
Ronald S. Fujino (Wilson) and memoranda in support. Hearing was 
scheduled for September 15, 1992, but was vacated due to a problem 
with service of the petition. The Petitions and supporting 
materials were refiled on September 9 and 10, 1992. The State 
filed a memorandum in opposition. A stipulated motion for 
expedited hearing was denied. 
The matters were heard on October 15, 1992. On this 
court's own motion, the matters were remanded to the district court 
for entry of findings concerning ineffective assistance of counsel. 
R. 299. An evidentiary hearing and argument was held in the 
district court on December 14 and 21, 1992 (R. 247-86) . The 
affidavit of John R. Bucher (trial counsel for petitioners) was 
xThis is a separate transcript. It is also included in the 
court file at 289-93, and again at 294-98. 
2Ms. Holbrook has transferred to a trial position within LDA 
and current counsel was substituted as appellate counsel in March. 
2 
entered into the record by stipulation. R. 320-1 (stip.), R. 322-3 
(aff., copy attached as Exhibit B). The trial court entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 5, 1993. R. 325-
329 (copy attached as Exhibit C) . 
An additional hearing was held on March 8, 1993, and 
Judge Rokich allowed withdrawal of petitioners' guilty pleas to 
Count I (racketeering, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603) . R. 330 (Todd, 
minute entry, copy attached as Exhibit D) , R. 3 64 (Wilson) . An 
additional notice of appeal was filed, R. 377 (Mr. Todd, Case No. 
930207-CA), R. 387-8 (Mr. Wilson, Case No. 930208), and motions 
were filed for each individual in this court to consolidate their 
respective appeals. 
For present purposes, these actions are identical. The 
district court record for both these cases are de facto 
consolidated. 
FACTS 
On December 30, 1991, Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson were 
induced to enter pleas of guilty to a pattern of unlawful activity 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603, 2nd degree felony) and theft by 
deception (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405, 3rd degree felony) by 
misinformed (and, appellant argues, constitutionally deficient) 
representations from their trial counsel. 
As inducement to enter the plea, prosecutor Greg Skordas 
gave trial counsel for Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson a signed letter 
agreement which provided in full: 
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John, 
•11 A s * ? u r t h e r inducement to settle this case, the State 
will affirmatively recommend that the defendants be 
granted probation & that if they are committed, contrary 
to the State's recommendation, to prison, we will 
stipulate to a plea withdrawel[sic] on both defendants, 
on all counts. 
C/s/] Greg Skordas 12/30/91 
£ge_ R. 304 (indicating this letter was submitted as an exhibit at 
12/14/92 evidentiary hearing) . This letter has been attached as an 
exhibit to various prior memoranda (e.g. , R. 123) . A copy is 
attached as exhibit E. The original is unpaginated, but is 
contained in the court file between R. 12 and R. 13. 
Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson were instructed by their trial 
attorney, John R. Bucher3, that the prosecutor's letter agreement 
to stipulate to withdrawal of the guilty pleas in the event of a 
prison sentence precluded the possibility that Mr. Todd or Mr. 
Wilson would serve time in prison as a result of the pleas. R. 
250-5. They were further instructed not to disclose this agreement 
to the trial court. R. 253-4. 
Within a week after the pleas had been entered, Mr. Todd 
and Mr. Wilson asked Mr. Bucher to withdraw their pleas. Mr. 
Bucher refused to do so. See Bucher Affidavit, R. 322-3 at H3 
(copy attached as Exhibit B) . Sentencing, originally scheduled for 
January 27, 1992, was continued to March 9, 1992 to allow time for 
a presentence investigation. R. 92. On March 9, 1992 Mr. Todd and 
Mr. Wilson were each sentenced to concurrent prison terms of one to 
3Bucher has since been suspended for at least six months as of 
May 19, 1992. See Utah Bar Journal, Vol. 5 No. 7 (August/September 
1992) p. 26. 
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fifteen and zero to five years. R. 102-3 (Todd), R. 105-6 
(Wilson). On March 30, 1992 Mr. Bucher filed a motion to withdraw 
petitioners' guilty pleas. R. 109-10. Contrary to his prior 
letter agreement, Mr. Skordas opposed this motion rather than 
stipulating to it. See State's Memorandum in Opposition, R.113-
116. At hearing on May 18, 1992 (see transcript, R. 210-217), the 
court took the matter under advisement. R. 127 (Todd), R. 128 
(Wilson) . On May 26, 1992 Judge Rokich denied the motion. R. 129-
31. As described in Appellate Procedural History, supra, this 
appeal and petition for certificate of probable cause ensued. 
FINDINGS ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
A copy of the trial court's findings and conclusions on 
ineffective assistance (R. 325-9) are attached as Exhibit C. In 
summary, the court's findings of fact are: (1) defendants were 
charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity and multiple counts of 
Theft by Deception; (2) & (3) John Bucher was the controlling 
attorney for both Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson; (4) & (5) Greg Skordas 
was the prosecutor, and executed the letter re: stipulated 
withdrawal of pleas if committed to prison; (6) the court was not 
informed of this agreement; (7) & (8) defendants are 
knowledgeable, etc.; (9) one element of Count I was'omitted from 
the information by the County Attorney's Office; (10-12) re: 
elements of charged offenses; (13) defendants stated they had no 
questions re: elements of offenses; (14-16) trial court explained 
that there were no promises re: sentence (prison was possible) 
5 
without objection; (17) trial court found pleas were entered 
knowingly and voluntarily; (18-19) defendants did not request and 
pleas were not withdrawn within 30 days; and (20-23) a hearing 
was held on ineffective assistance, Mr. Wilson testified, Mr. 
Bucher did not appear4 and Mr. Todd did not testify,5 
In summary, the court's conclusions of law are: (1) 
defendants were not credible witnesses; (2) "It 'belies 
credibility' to think that Defendants would not say anything to 
either the Court or their counsel when the Court sentenced them to 
prison."; (3) there was "no credible evidence presented that Mr. 
Bucher was ineffective"; (4) the court allows plea to Count I to 
be withdrawn because of the omission in the Information; and (5) 
court denies defendants' motion to withdraw guilty pleas to Count 
II. 
Mr. Wilson (and by stipulation, Mr. Todd also) testified 
to several matters not contained in the trial courts findings: 
Q. [by Ms. Bowman] WHAT DID THAT LETTER 
TDATED 12/30/91 FROM PROSECUTOR SKORDAS1 MEAN TO YOU? 
A. TMr. Wilsonl IT MEANT TO ME, FROM LOOKING 
AT IT-- AND IT WAS SIGNED BY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY--
REGARDLESS OF WHATEVER HAPPENED AT SENTENCING THAT OUR 
ATTORNEY COULD APPROACH THE BENCH-- IS WHAT HE TOLD US--
AND SHOW THIS TO THE JUDGE AND THAT OUR PLEA COULD BE 
WITHDRAWN AND WE COULD TAKE THE CASE TO TRIAL, THAT WE 
4But see Affidavit of Bucher, R. 322-3 (copy attached as 
Exhibit B), R. 320-1 (stipulation to enter affidavit in record). 
sBut see the transcript (R. 272:12-17): 
THE COURT: ANY OTHER WITNESSES? 
MS. BOWMAN: I WOULD PUT MR. TODD ON FOR A 
VERY BRIEF OUTLINE OF ABOUT THE SAME THING. 
MR. SKORDAS: I STIPULATE THAT MR. TODD, IF 
ASKED THE SAME SERIES OF QUESTIONS, WOULD ANSWER IN THE 
EXACT SAME FASHION, IF THAT WILL SAVE TIME. 
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WERE GUARANTEED THAT WE WON'T GO TO PRISON OR TO JAIL 
BECAUSE OF THAT LETTER, AT THAT TIME, AND WE COULD TAKE 
OUR CASE TO TRIAL AND IT COULD GO FROM THERE. 
Q. IF YOU TOOK IT TO TRIAL, YOU UNDERSTOOD 
THAT YOU COULD GO TO PRISON IF YOU WERE FOUND GUILTY OF 
IT? 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
Q. BUT THIS WAS A GUARANTEE THAT YOU COULD 
NOT BE SENT TO PRISON ON A GUILTY PLEA? 
A.J. EXACTLY. 
O. AND WHO TOLD YOU ABOUT THAT GUARANTEE? 
A, JOHN BUCHER. WHO WAS OUR ATTORNEY AT THE 
TIME. 
251:3-22 (emphasis added). 
THE WITNESS: JOHN TOLD US NOT TO TELL THE 
JUDGE ABOUT THE LETTER, AND THAT WE SHOULD JUST HANG ON 
TO THE LETTER UNLESS WE WERE SENT TO PRISON OR JAIL, AND 
THEN AT THAT TIME HE WOULD APPROACH THE JUDGE AND SHOW 
HIM THE LETTER THAT WE COULD WITHDRAW THE PLEA AT THAT 
TIME, WITH THAT LETTER. 
Q. (BY MS. BOWMAN) OKAY. AND WHAT WAS THE 
PURPOSE-- AND MAYBE YOU SAID THIS WHEN I WAS PASSING THE 
LETTER TO THE JUDGE, BUT WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE THAT YOU 
THOUGHT OF NOT SHOWING THIS LETTER TO THE JUDGE? 
A. HE TOLD US NOT TO SHOW THE LETTER TO THE 
JUDGE BECAUSE HE FELT THAT IF WE SHOWED THE LETTER TO THE 
JUDGE, MR. SKORDAS AND MR. BUCHER, WITH THAT LETTER 
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM, THAT WE'D BE STEPPING ON THE 
JUDGE'S FEET; AND THAT WE JUST HAVE THIS LETTER AND THAT 
IF WE WERE SENT TO JAIL OR PRISON WE COULD SHOW THEM THE 
LETTER AND WITHDRAW IT. HE FELT IT MAY INSULT THE JUDGE 
THAT WE WAS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE 
COURTROOM. 
253:6-11 (emphasis added). 
Q. WOULD YOU HAVE ENTERED THAT PLEA IF YOU 
KNEW THAT THAT LETTER WAS NOT A GUARANTEE? 
A. DEFINITELY NOT. I WOULD NEVER HAVE PLED 
GUILTY TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY AND A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY IF I HAD THOUGHT THAT. WE JUST WANTED TO GET IT 
ALL WRAPPED UP AND OUT OF THE WAY BECAUSE WE BECAUSE WE 
HAD PAID OUR ATTORNEY SO MUCH MONEY, AND EVERYTHING, AND 
WE JUST WANTED TO GET IT WRAPPED UP. 
Q. WERE YOU EVER TOLD THAT A JUDGE DOES NOT 
HAVE TO WITHDRAW YOUR GUILTY PLEA[?] 
A. HE TOLD US THAT REGARDLESS OF-- HOW HE 
PUT IT WAS THE POWER OF THIS LETTER, THE POWER OF THIS--
HE SAYS, "YOU GUYS DO NOT REALIZE THE POWER OF THIS 
LETTER." HE GOES, "REGARDLESS OF WHAT MR. ROKICH DOES--
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JUDGE ROKICH DOES AT SENTENCING, WE CAN APPROACH HIM WITH 
THAT LETTER AND WE CAN CHANGE THE PLEA REGARDLESS AND YOU 
WON'T GO TO JAIL OR PRISON AT THAT TIME. YOU'LL HAVE THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE IT TO TRIAL." 
R. 255:5-23. Mr. Wilson testified that Mr. Bucher did not explain 
the elements of racketeering or theft by deception. After entering 
the pleas, Wilson looked the crimes up in the library and concluded 
that he and Mr. Todd were not guilty. He and Mr. Todd requested 
that Bucher withdraw the pleas (about 6 to 8 times) , but Bucher 
wouldn't, saying that the letter protected them. R. 255-8. By 
stipulation, Mr. Todd's testimony would have been to the same 
effect. R. 272:12-17. 
Mr. Bucher's affidavit is in accord with the testimony of 
Messrs. Todd and Wilson. It indicates that within a week of entry 
of the guilty pleas, both defendants came to his office and asked 
that the pleas be withdrawn, but Mr. Bucher "advised the defendants 
that the motion was premature and that the motion should not be 
filed until the trial court sentenced them." 
The trial court made its concerns clear: 
THE COURT: WHAT REALLY CONCERNS ME HERE, 
YOU HAD TWO DEFENDANTS WHO ARE NOT THE UNSOPHISTICATED 
TYPE OF INDIVIDUALS. THEY WERE BRIGHT ENOUGH TO PUT THIS 
BUSINESS TOGETHER. AND I WENT THROUGH THIS TRANSCRIPT 
AND WENT THROUGH RULE 11 AND ASKED THEM ON A NUMBER OF 
OCCASIONS IF THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE NO PROMISES 
MADE BY THIS COURT, AND THEY DID. AND IF THEY'RE GOING 
TO BE A PARTY TO THIS TYPE OF CONDUCT, THEY ARE GOING TO 
PAY THE CONSEQUENCES. AND THE CONSEQUENCES ARE I'M NOT 
GOING TO FIND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL NOR SET 
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT. 
AND THEY CAN'T STAND HERE AND TELL ME ONE DAY 
THAT THEY UNDERSTAND AND KNOW ALL OF THIS AND I'M NOT 
BOUND BY ANY REPRESENTATIONS, AND THEN COME IN AT A LATER 
DATE AFTER I SENTENCE THEM AND TELL ME SOMETHING ELSE. 
THE JUDGMENT WILL STAND . . . 
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R. 280:6-22. The court indicated its opinion that any 
ineffectiveness of counsel was harmless. R. 282:11-13. 
After the court entered its findings, an additional 
hearing was held at which defense counsel objected to the court's 
findings. The following exchange occurred: 
[by Ms. Stam] LAST FRIDAY-- FROM THE RECORD, 
THERE WAS A BENCH CONFERENCE AFTER THE COURT SENTENCED 
MR. TODD. HE WAS THE FIRST PERSON TO BE SENTENCED-- I 
INQUIRED OF BOTH YOU AND MR. SKORDAS WHAT THAT BENCH 
CONFERENCE ENTAILED, AND I BELIEVE THAT THE MEMORY WAS 
SOMETHING TO DO WITH CONCURRENT VERSUS CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES. 
I HAVE SPOKEN WITH MR. BUCHER TODAY WHO TELLS 
ME, AT THE BENCH CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS NOT RECORDED, THAT 
WHAT IN FACT OCCURRED WAS THAT HE PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
A COPY OF MR. SKORDAS' STIPULATION INDICATING THAT HE HAD 
AGREED THAT MR. WILSON AND MR. TODD CAN WITHDRAW THEIR 
GUILTY PLEAS, OR STIPULATED THAT THEY COULD. AND HE 
WOULD TESTIFY TODAY, YOUR HONOR, UNDER OATH-- AND WE 
TENDER HIM TO THE COURT-- THAT THAT IS WHAT OCCURRED. 
THE COURT: LOOK, YOU KNOW, I THINK I HAVE 
PRETTY WELL MADE MY POSITION CLEAR. I DON'T HAVE ANY 
CREDIBILITY FROM ANY OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THIS 
CASE. THEY CAN'T COME HERE ONE DAY AND TELL ME ONE THING 
AND COME HERE ANOTHER DAY AND TELL ME ANOTHER. JUST 
WHATEVER THEY THINK IS APPROPRIATE AT THE TIME. I HAVE 
FOUND THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES ARE CREDIBLE SO. 
THFttEFORgr THEIR TESTIMONY TODAY IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE 
MY OPINION. AND I THINK MY FINDINGS PRETTY WELL SPELL 
OUT WHAT TRANSPIRED. 
R. 400:16-401:15 (emphasis added). 
MS. STAM: THE ONLY OTHER THING, YOUR 
HONOR, IS THE AFFIDAVIT THAT WE PREPARED ON MR. BUCHER'S 
TESTIMONY, I WOULD ASK YOU TO CONSIDER ONE MORE TIME IN 
TERMS OF HE'S HERE TODAY AND WOULD TESTIFY UNDER OATH 
THAT BOTH MR. TODD AND MR. WILSON CAME TO HIM AFTER THEY 
ENTERED THEIR PLEA OF GUILTY AND BEFORE THEY WERE 
SENTENCED AND ASKED HIM TO ALLOW THEM OR HELP THEM 
WITHDRAW THEIR GUILTY PLEAS. AND WE WOULD ASK THE COURT 
TO ALLOW HIM TO TESTIFY OR AT LEAST ACCEPT THE AFFIDAVIT. 
THE COURT: WELL. YOU KNOW WHAT? THE FACT--
BUT MY PROBLEM IS THEY DON'T HAVE ANY-- THE THREE OF THEM 
DON'T HAVE ANY CREDIBILITY SO. THEREFORE. I AM NOT GOING 
TO ACCEPT THAT AS BEING A TRUTHFUL STATEMENT. I'M JUST 
NOT GOING TO. 
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HE MAY SIGN THE AFFIDAVIT AND YOU CAN FILE IT 
AS SUCH, BUT I MADE MY FINDINGS THAT THEY'RE NOT CREDIBLE 
AND I'M GOING TO STAND BY THAT FINDING. 
R. 408:13-409:5 (emphasis added). 
The trial court was irritated by what transpired. Mr. 
Skordas signed the following statement in Mr. Todd's plea 
affidavit: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State 
of Utah in the case against [handwritten! Steven Todd, 
defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the 
defendant and find that the declaration, including the 
elements of the offense of the charge (s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a 
plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations 
are fully contained in the statement and in the attached 
plea agreement6 or as supplemented on record before the 
court7. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for 
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public 
interest. 
I si Gregory G. Skordas /3865 
R. 76-77. Mr. Wilson's is identical except for name of defendant. 
R. 87-8. Mr. Skordas' statement was incorrect and untruthful. Mr. 
Bucher instructed petitioners not to disclose the letter agreement 
to the judge. They merely followed the advice and strict orders of 
counsel. Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson are not culpable in the antics of 
Mr. Bucher and Mr. Skordas, and should not be punished for the 
transgressions of others. 
It is essential to note that petitioners have no 
significant prior involvement with the criminal justice system. 
*There was no attached plea agreement. 
7There was no supplementation on record before the court. 
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While petitioners are relatively sophisticated individuals 
(especially in light of only having completed schooling through the 
tenth grade, R. 75 (Todd) , and one year of college, R. 86 
(Wilson)), petitioners are not criminal lawyers, had no prior 
experience with criminal lawyers, and of necessity were forced to 
rely on the advice (good and bad) of their hired counsel. This is 
precisely why we have a constitutional right to counsel: the 
average accused has insufficient knowledge and experience to 
present an adequate criminal defense. We require adequate, 
effective representation so that the accused are not punished for 
the shortcomings of their counsel. In this case, Messrs. Todd and 
Wilson have been and continue to be punished for the shortcomings 
of their counsel, and of counsel for the State. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD FOR ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE, 
Stay of a criminal sentence pending appeal is governed by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (1990), rather than by U.R.Cr.P. 27. 
State v. Larsen. 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993) . This section 
provides: 
77-20-10. Grounds for detaining defendant while 
appealing his conviction -- Conditions for release while 
on appeal. 
(1) The court shall order that a defendant who has 
been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment in jail or prison, and who has filed an 
appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be 
detained, unless the court finds: 
(a) the appeal raises a substantial question of 
law or fact likely to result in: 
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(i) reversal; 
(ii) an order for a new trial; or 
(iii) a sentence that does not include a 
term of imprisonment in jail or prison; 
(b) the appeal is not for the purpose of delay; 
and 
(c) by clear and convincing evidence presented 
by the defendant that he is not likely to flee the 
jurisdiction of the court, and will not pose a 
danger to the physical, psychological, or financial 
and economic safety or well-being of any other 
person or the community if released. 
This appeal raises at least one substantial question of law or fact 
likely to result in reversal or a new trial, is not for the purpose 
of delay, and Mr. Todd is not likely to flee or pose a danger to 
individuals or the community. Mr. Todd should be granted a 
certificate of probable cause. 
II. MERITS OF ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL, 
This appeal raises the following issues: 
1. Does the prosecutor's failure to comply 
with the terms of the plea agreement require the 
withdrawal of the guilty plea? 
2. Does ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel in the plea process require the withdrawal of the 
guilty pleas? 
3. Does defendant's misapprehension 
concerning the possibility of incarceration render the 
pleas involuntary and require their withdrawal? 
4. Does the plea affidavit and plea colloquy 
fail to comport with the requirements of Rule 11 and fail 
to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary entry of the 
pleas, requiring withdrawal of the pleas? 
Each of these issues is sufficient to require a reversal. 
To prevail on his petition for a certificate of probable cause, Mr. 
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Todd need only show that one of these issues raises a substantial 
question of law or fact likely to result in reversal. 
A. PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE 
TERMS OF TEE PLEA AGREEMENT. 
The prosecutor's agreement (to stipulate to withdrawal of 
the pleas if the court, contrary to the State's recommendation, 
recommends incarceration) is properly in the record, and the trial 
court specifically found that the prosecutor executed the 
agreement. Factual Finding 5. Nevertheless, the State opposed Mr. 
Todd's motion to withdraw the pleas. R. 113-116 (State's 
Memorandum in Opposition). 
A prosecutor's failure to keep a plea agreement requires 
withdrawal of the plea, as does the accused's entry of a guilty 
plea on the basis of a misunderstanding of the value of the 
prosecutor's agreement. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274-6 
(Utah 1988) ("It is well established that a prosecutor may not make 
promises which induce a guilty plea and then refuse to keep those 
promises.11). "If the court or the prosecutor refuses to comply 
with the terms of the plea [after acceptance] , the defendant may 
choose to withdraw the plea. The trial court may not refuse to 
comply with the terms of the accepted agreement unless 
circumstances justify the declaration of a misplea; otherwise, the 
double jeopardy clause will preclude a subsequent trial of the 
defendant." State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986). The 
State in this case is attempting to hold Mr. Todd to his agreement, 
without upholding its part of the bargain to stipulate to 
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withdrawal of the guilty pleas if the sentence imposed includes 
incarceration. This issue is substantial, is likely to result in 
a reversal, and justifies issuance of a certificate of probable 
cause in this case. 
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
IN TEE PLEA PROCESS. 
The trial court found that ft[t]he Court cannot make a 
finding of ineffective counsel because there was no credible 
evidence presented that Mr. Bucher was ineffective." This factual 
finding is contrary to all the evidence presented.8 The court's 
credibility determination is an abuse of discretion, and its 
factual finding is clearly erroneous. 
The State has stipulated to the existence of the Skordas 
letter, and the court found that it was executed by Skordas. The 
existence of this letter raises substantial questions regarding the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the representation received by 
petitioners. Furthermore, there is no testimony or evidence 
controverting the statements of petitioners and their counsel as to 
the representations and advice given by Mr. Bucher to petitioners. 
Under the circumstances, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to completely discredit all three witnesses. Other 
jurisdictions would so hold: 
It is a well-established rule in Arizona in 
civil cases that the trier of fact may not arbitrarily 
8The State did not call any witnesses, nor cross-examine any 
witnesses. All testimony presented was proffered by the 
defendants. 
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reject uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence from a 
disinterested witness where nothing in the evidence or 
the circumstances casts suspicion on it. The rule is 
equally applicable to criminal cases. A reviewing court 
will scrutinize to determine if there was any justifiable 
basis on which the trier of fact could have distrusted 
testimony, but where there is none, that testimony cannot 
be disregarded even by a jury. 
State v. Roberts, 673 P.2d 974 (Ariz. App. 1983). In this case, 
Mr. Bucher is disinterested. His only relationship is as former 
trial counsel for defendants. In fact, Mr. Bucher may have an 
interest in not disclosing facts concerning his ineffectiveness, in 
order to protect his own interests. His testimony must be 
believed. The testimony of petitioners is consistent, coherent, 
and uncontradicted, and follows directly from the existence of the 
letter. Mr. Bucher's misconduct and weaknesses are only being held 
against petitioners. The trial court has found that he has no 
credibility with the court as a result of his failure to disclose 
the letter agreement to the court, and his advice to his clients to 
withhold information from the court. Inexplicably, the trial court 
is unwilling to extend that deficient, perhaps unprofessional 
conduct to a determination that petitioners have been deprived of 
constitutionally adequate representation. The judge's factual 
finding that there was no ineffective assistance, and if there was 
it was harmless, is contrary not only to the great weight of the 
evidence, but to ALL the evidence. 
The only Utah case law addressing ineffective assistance 
of counsel in plea proceedings is State v. Ford. 793 P.2d 397 (Utah 
1991) . Ford establishes the constitutional right to counsel in 
IS 
plea proceedings, but fails to delineate specific duties of counsel 
during the course of plea proceedings. 
In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must 
show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 
, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); see also State v. Tenrolin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
Mr. Bucher's advice that petitioners should not inform 
the trial court of the State's agreement (to stipulate to 
withdrawal) was unsound and deficient. His advice to enter a plea 
agreement based on an undisclosed side agreement concerning 
withdrawal of the guilty pleas was unsound and deficient. His 
failure to withdraw petitioners' guilty pleas when requested by 
petitioners to do so is deficient performance. The legal advice 
Mr. Bucher gave (to wait until after sentencing to withdraw) was 
unsound and deficient. Counsel's failure to seek or obtain an 
extension of time for moving to withdrawal, so that petitioners 
could be sentenced prior to expiration of the time allowed for 
moving to withdrawal, was deficient. On the whole, petitioners did 
not receive effective assistance from their counsel. 
Finally, petitioners have been prejudiced. Had the court 
been informed of the State's agreement, the court would either have 
accepted the conditional plea, or declined to accept it. Had it 
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been accepted, petitioners would not have had to serve time in 
prison. Had the court rejected the conditional plea, then 
petitioners would be entitled to a trial by jury, together with its 
incident constitutional protections. Only upon a verdict of guilty 
would petitioners have run the risk of incarceration. In either 
event, Mr. Bucher's deficient performance has prejudiced 
petitioners. 
The trial court disagrees: 
THE COURT: STRICKLAND, THE STRICKLAND CASE, 
RIGHT. AND THE OUTCOME WOULD NOT BE ANY DIFFERENT 
WHETHER THEY HAD INEFFECTIVE OR EFFECTIVE COUNSEL. 
MS. STAM: YOUR HONOR, THE OUTCOME WOULD BE 
ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT. 
THE COURT: NO IT WOULDN'T. 
MS. STAM: THESE PEOPLE WERE PROMISED THAT 
IF THEY PLED GUILTY THEY WOULDN'T GO TO PRISON; THEY 
WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY THEN TO GO TO TRIAL. NOW, 
PERHAPS THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AND WOULD HAVE 
GOTTEN PRISON, BUT THAT'S THE OUTCOME THAT WOULD BE 
DIFFERENT. THEY WOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED THEIR PLEAS HAD 
THEY BEEN TOLD BY THEIR LAWYER AND THE JUDGE AND THE 
PROSECUTOR THAT A STIPULATION BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT 
BINDING, BUT THEY--
THE COURT: DO YOU KNOW WHAT'S STRANGE? 
• • • 
NO, AS I SAID, I'VE HEARD ALL THE ARGUMENT I'M 
GOING TO HEAR. JUDGMENT STANDS AND WE'LL GO FROM THERE, 
R. 282:11-283:15- The trial court is confused. He is certainly 
correct when he states that he personally would not have accepted 
a conditional plea. However, if the no incarceration guarantee was 
not in place, petitioners would not have pled guilty, and 
incarceration would only be a possibility upon conviction by jury. 
Petitioners believed the judge when he stated he could sentence 
them to prison. However, petitioners believed, based on advice of 
counsel, that the court would have to honor the State's stipulation 
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to withdrawal of the pleas if incarceration were ordered, and 
consequently there was an absolute, unconditional guarantee in 
place that they would not be incarcerated without first going to 
trial. 
Counsel was ineffective, this issue is substantial, is 
likely to result in a reversal, and justifies issuance of a 
certificate of probable cause in this case. 
C. MISAPPREHENSION CONCERNING THE 
POSSIBILITY OF INCARCERATION RENDERS THE 
PLEAS INVOLUNTARY. 
To the extent that the guilty pleas were entered as a 
result of petitioners' misinformed belief that they were immune 
from incarceration, they are involuntary and should be withdrawn. 
See, e.g.. State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1275-6 (Utah 1988); 
Machibroda v. United States. 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, , 
7 L.Ed.2d 473, 478 (1962) ("A guilty plea, if induced by promises 
or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is 
void."). 
In Machibroda, petitioner alleged that he had been 
promised "that he would receive a total prison sentence of not more 
than twenty years if he pleaded guilty to both informations. These 
promises were said to have been made upon the authority of the 
United States Attorney and to be agreeable to the District Judge. 
It was alleged that the petitioner had been cautioned not to tell 
his own lawyer about the conversations." Id. at 489, 82 S.Ct. at 
, 7 L.Ed.2d at 476. 
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This case is quite similar to Machibroda. although the 
players' positions are somewhat changed. Messrs, Todd and Wilson 
were promised by the prosecutor's letter that they would not have 
to serve time in jail or prison. In both cases, the judge was not 
informed of the details of the promises. Petitioners were sworn to 
secrecy (by the US attorney in Machibroda, and by defense counsel 
here) . 
The Supreme Court held: 
There will always be marginal cases, and this 
case is not far from the line. But the specific and 
detailed factual assertions of the petitioner, while 
improbable, cannot at this juncture be said to be 
incredible. If the allegations are true, the petitioner 
is clearly entitled to relief. 
Id. at 496, 82 S.Ct. at , 7 L.Ed.2d at 479. In this case, 
petitioners allegations are true, and they are entitled to relief. 
Their guilty pleas should be withdrawn. 
This issue is substantial, is likely to result in a 
reversal, and justifies issuance of a certificate of probable cause 
in this case. 
D. INADEQUATE PLEA AFFIDAVIT AND COLLOQUY. 
The trial court, on remand, admitted that the affidavit 
and colloquy were inadequate with respect to Count I, racketeering, 
and allowed petitioners to withdraw their pleas to that count. On 
Count II, the affidavits and colloquys fail to show that 
petitioners understood the elements of the crimes to which they 
pled guilty. The affidavits and colloquys further fail to disclose 
the terms of the plea agreement, in violation of Rule 11(5)(f). 
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"Concern for the legitimacy or truth of a guilty plea is 
an integral part of ascertaining the voluntariness of that plea. 
Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e) (2)9 requires the court to find that a guilty 
plea is voluntarily made before it accepts it. A guilty plea 
cannot be voluntary if it is uninformed.fl State v. Breckenridcre. 
688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983). 
The plea affidavit signed by Steven Todd states: 
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am 
charged are as follows: [handwritten!as a group there was 
direct or indirect participation in an enterprise that 
functions through a pattern of unlawful activity. 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons 
for which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the 
elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
[handwritten! I helped participate in a car brokerage 
that had as a pattern of activity theft bv deception on 
customers seeking a car 
R. 72. Mr. Wilson's plea affidavit is similar, R. 83. Nothing in 
this statement indicates that petitioners had the intent to 
"obtain [] or exercised control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990). The plea colloquy likewise fails to show 
intent: 
THE COURT: AND THE FACTS IN THIS CASE ARE 
THAT, MR. TODD, YOU STATE THAT YOU HELPED PARTICIPATE IN 
A CAR BROKERAGE THAT HAD A PATTERN OF ACTIVITY THEFT BY 
DECEPTION ON CUSTOMERS SEEKING A CAR; IS THAT CORRECT? 
THE DEFENDANT TODD: YES SIR. 
R. 184:1-6. These statements are tautological. Mr. Todd pled 
guilty, but did not express the intent required by law. 
Currently designated 11(5) (b) . 
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Similar problems exist with respect to disclosure of the 
terms of the plea agreement. See U.R.Cr.P 11(5) (f) . This issue is 
fully briefed in Mr. Wilson's memorandum, and is incorporated here 
by reference. 
This issue is substantial, is likely to result ' in a 
reversal, and justifies issuance of a certificate of probable cause 
in this case. 
III. THIS APPEAL IS NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF DELAY, 
This appeal is not for the purpose of delay. There is 
strong merit to the points raised by appellants. Indeed, the trial 
court's reluctant acquiescence in withdrawal of each petitioner's 
plea to racketeering (Count I) indicates that even the trial judge 
admits that this appeal, as originally filed, was unquestionably 
meritorious. Remaining issues on appeal are also meritorious. 
IV. MR. TODD IS NOT LIKELY TO FLEE THE 
JURISDICTION, AND POSES NO DANGER TO ANYONE. 
Mr. Todd currently has a parole date of September, 1993. 
Mr. Todd's appellate counsel has received requests from the parole 
board confirming that the second degree felony plea has been 
withdrawn, and as a result thereof Mr. Todd may receive an earlier 
date. Mr. Bryant is currently on parole without incident. 
Mr. Todd has twice been released on his own recognizance 
to pretrial services, after being charged, and after entry of his 
guilty pleas but before sentencing. His past record of compliance 
(as well as that of his codefendant) is clear and convincing 
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evidence that he may again be released to pretrial services without 
incident. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal raises four substantial issues likely to 
result in reversal, and only one such issue is required. This 
appeal is not for purposes of delay. Mr. Todd is not a threat to 
flee the jurisdiction, and poses no danger to others. This court 
should grant Mr. Todd a certificate of probable cause. This court 
should order that Mr. Todd be released to pretrial services. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of May, 1993. 
ROBERT K. HEtNEMAN 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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